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Introduction
Patent law is the protector of our innovations and part of a lucrative,
$5 trillion economy in the United States.' The foundation of patent law is
a quid pro quo exchange in which an inventor discloses an innovation to
t B.S.E. University of Pennsylvania, 2007; Candidate forJ.D., Cornell Law School,
2010; Managing Editor, Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 43. I would like to
thank my ILJ colleagues for all of their work on this Note. I would also like to thank my
parents and brother for their continually unwavering love, support, and advice. I am
grateful for the guidance that Judge Allegra and Judge Gajarsa provided me during my
tenure as their intern. All misjudgments, errors, and omissions are my own.
1. Sean Silverthorne, Monetizing IP: The Executive's Challenge, Q&A with: Josh Ler-
ner, WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Harvard Bus. Sch., Boston, Mass.), June 9, 2008, http://
hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5925.html.
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the public and, in turn, receives a limited-time exclusive right to the pat-
ented subject matter.2 The disclosure of this new, useful, and nonobvious
invention 3 ideally promotes innovation by allowing others to develop new
technology by building on the disclosed inventions. 4 As a reward for the
substantial time, money, risk, and effort invested in this invention, the pat-
ent owner can prevent anyone from making, using, or selling that invention
for the life of the patent.5 The right to exclude is a powerful and valuable
tool: if someone infringes on the patent, the patent owner can bring a civil
suit.6 The infringer, however, can return the threat by countersuing and
challenging the validity of the patent. 7 The threat of invalidity prevents
companies that rely on their exclusive right to produce patented goods
from liberally suing and strikes a balance of risk that protects both the
patentee and infringer.8
This delicate balance is destroyed when the patent owner has nothing
to lose. This is the case with non-producing entities, commonly referred to
as "patent trolls."9 These trolls purchase patents from bankrupt compa-
nies, individual inventors, or small corporations that cannot afford to pro-
tect their patent rights. 10 Patent trolls rarely produce any products using
these patents; instead, they generate income by seeking out companies that
integrate the patented invention into products that are placed on the mar-
ket.' Once they find their target, they negotiate exorbitant license agree-
ments by threatening to sue. 12 These patent trolls have a significant
advantage: they produce nothing, so the threat of countersuit is financially
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science ... by
securing for limited Times ... to Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries.");
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (2009); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966).
3. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
4. See Carol M. Nielsen & Michael R. Samardzija, Compulsory Patent Licensing: Is it
a Viable Solution in the United States?, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 509, 512
(2007).
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
6. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS OV-1 (1995).
7. See Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTELL.
PROP. L. BULL. 1, 4 (2005).
8. See id.
9. Peter Detkin, former Assistant General Counsel of Intel, claims to have coined
this term in 2001 while describing companies that buy, rather than create, patents and
then extract disproportionally high license fees by threatening expensive litigation in the
alternative. See Peter N. Detkin, Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 636, 636 (2007); Brenda Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling
for Dollars, THE RECORDER, July 30, 2001.
10. See generally Patricia S. Abril & Robert Plant, The Patent Holder's Dilemma: Buy,
Sell, or Troll?, COMM. A.C.M., Jan. 2007, at 37 (discussing the various means by which
patents become available at low costs to patent trolls).
11. See Leslie T. Grab, Recent Development, Equitable Concerns of eBay v.
MercExchange: Did the Supreme Court Successfully Balance Patent Protection Against Pat-
ent Trolls?, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 81, 84-85 (2006).
12. See Abril & Plant, supra note 10, at 43 (explaining that Microsoft spends $100
million annually to defend itself against patent lawsuits).
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negligible. 13 But they have everything to win, and they usually do. Under
pressure from patent trolls, most companies settle to avoid expensive litiga-
tion and the threat of permanent injunctions. 14 Patent trolls have been
especially successful recently, for example forcing the Blackberry wireless
provider, RIM, to settle for $612.5 million in lieu of potential permanent
injunctions. 15 Although patent trolls have yet to destroy a Fortune 500
company, some fear that it is possible.
1 6
No statutes specifically address trolls and until recently, few legisla-
tors, lobbyists or companies have pushed for proactive measures aimed at
trolls. 1 7 In the past few years, however, CEOs, judges, and congressmen
have recognized that the presence of the patent troll is a threat to innova-
tion and progress,' 8 and they are making a concerted effort to reign in
patent trolls and minimize these crippling licensing fees.19 Several com-
monly known companies, such as Google, Apple, eBay, and Dell, are col-
laborating to fend off these trolls. 20 For many years, the judiciary made
few attempts to curtail the power of patent trolls.2 1 In the past two years,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court has stepped in and trended toward strip-
ping power from patent trolls.2 2 Most notably, Justice Kennedy denounced
patent trolls during oral argument and in his concurring opinion in eBay v.
MercExchange.2 3
The Legislative Branch has also recently taken steps towards address-
ing the patent troll issue. In 2005, Congress held a hearing targeted at
13. See Danielle Williams & Steven Gardner, Basic Framework for Effective Responses
to Patent Trolls, IP LINKS (N.C. Bar Ass'n Intellectual Prop. Law Section, Cary, N.C.), Apr.
2006, at 1, 1 [hereinafter Basic Framework for Effective Responses to Patent Trolls].
14. SeeJohn M. Golden, Commentary, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 2111, 2129 (2007); Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent
Trolls: The Divergent Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. Bus. LJ. 689, 722
(2006).
15. Ian Austen, BlackBerry Service to Continue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at Cl.
16. James Kanter, Ownership of Ideas is High-Stakes Game, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 3,
2005, at 1.
17. See infra Part I.B-D.
18. See David G. Barker, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with an Open Post-
Grant Review, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, TI 7-10 (2005).
19. See James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alterna-
tive View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY LJ. 189, 193-97
(2006).
20. See infra Part lI.B.
21. See infra Part II.D.
22. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (setting the bar for nonob-
viousness higher and potentially threatening the enforceability of vague, improvement
patents often owned by patent trolls); Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118
(2007) (allowing licensees to file declaratory judgments against licensors, i.e. patent
trolls, despite the licensees being in good standing); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388 (2006) (rejecting the Federal Circuit's patent-specific rule for permanent
injunctions in favor of a traditional four-factor test that may not favor patent trolls).
23. 547 U.S. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). For further discussion, see infra
Part II.D.
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understanding the factors contributing to the patent troll problem, 24 and it
considered several measures aimed at minimizing their power.25 Although
the resulting 2005 bill did not pass, another bill was proposed in 2007.
The Patent Reform Act of 200726 included the same anti-troll provisions of
the 2005 bill, and although the bill passed the House of Representatives, it
stalled on the Senate floor, failing to pass before the 110th Congress
ended. 27 At the time of this Note's publication, a bill similar to the Patent
Reform Act of 2007 is currently under consideration in both the Senate
and House.28 Regardless, it remains unclear whether these provisions
would have any impact on patent troll practices.29
In Europe, like the United States, patents represent a quid pro quo
exchange between the inventor and the public.30 The European Patent
Office, which is analogous to the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, grants patents for inventions that are both novel and non-obvious. 31
Once granted, these European patents are enforced on a national level
through country-specific patent-infringement litigation.32 In light of these
similarities, patent trolls should be equally prevalent in Europe. 33 Yet,
Europe has remained relatively unscathed by patent trolls.34 The question
is why. Potential reasons include the nature of the European patent grant
system-the relatively narrow scope of subject matter for patents, the capa-
bility of post-grant opposition proceedings, and administrative costs-as
well as the nature of patent litigation in Europe-the impact of the prospect
of attorney fees, "loser pays" litigation, and the complexity of multinational
litigation.35
24. See generally Patent Trolls: Fact or Fiction?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Patent Hearings].
25. See Donald S. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 336, 340-44 (2005).
26. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
27. See S. REP. No. 110-259, at 35 (2008).
28. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of
2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009).
29. See Ashley Chuang, Note, Fixing the Failures of Software Patent Protection: Deter-
ring Patent Trolling by Applying Industry-Specific Patentability Standards, 16 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 215, 237 (2006).
30. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974).
31. See Jinseok Park, Has Patentable Subject Matter Been Expanded?-A Comparative
Study on Software Patent Practices in the European Patent Office, the United States Patent
and Trademark Office and the Japanese Patent Office, 13 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 336, 343
(2005).
32. See Randy L. Campbell, Note, Global Patent Law Harmonization: Benefits and
Implementation, 13 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 605, 616 (2003).
33. See Morag Macdonald, Beware of the Troll, THE LAw., Sept. 26, 2005, http://www.
thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=l 16783&d=122&h=24&f=46.
34. SeeJoe Brennan et al., Patent Trolls in the U.S., Japan, Taiwan and Europe, CASRIP
(CASRIP/Univ. Wash. Sch. Law, Seattle, Wash.), Spring/Summer 2006, § X.A, http://
www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/Newsletter/Default.aspx?article=Newsvl3i2Brennan
EtAl (discussing the current patent troll situation in Europe and noting that the issue is
not as prominent in Europe).
35. See Macdonald, supra note 33.
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This Note explores the potential reasons why patent trolls shy away
from Europe and proposes effective amendments to the U.S. patent system.
Part I explores the nature of patent trolls, how they operate, and why they
thrive within the United States. Part II discusses the negative effects of
patent trolls and what reactive measures the technology industry, the Judi-
cial Branch, and the Legislative Branch have taken. Part III explores key
differences between the European patent system and the American system
to determine which differences contribute to the dearth of European patent
trolls and proposes changes to the U.S. system.
I. The Patent Troll
A. Defining a Patent Troll
Although there is no single agreed upon definition, the term "patent
troll" has quickly become one of the most threatening terms to the technol-
ogy industry. Peter Detkin coined the term "patent troll" when he was the
Assistant General Counsel of Intel Corporation.36 He explained that "[a]
patent troll is somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that
they are not practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most
cases never practiced."3 7 Throughout the years, litigators and industry
leaders have applied the term to various individual and corporate entities
in different situations, including those who invent but do not manufacture
products embodying their patent, those who offer to license instead of
suing for infringement, those who sue alleged infringers with lucrative
products already on the market, small entities who sue large corporations
with deeper pockets, and those who do not "use" their patent. 38 Most fre-
quently, the term refers to an entity that threatens an infringement suit
against product-manufacturing companies without using or having the
potential to use the patent itself. 3 9
B. Building a Trolling Arsenal
To be worthy of the title "patent troll," entities must have a threatening
arsenal of patents. The key to a powerful patent troll is a portfolio of inex-
pensive, broad, and widely applicable patents. 40 Entities acquire such pat-
ents in various ways. Occasionally, an individual or company will invent
and attempt to use a patent productively, but after failing to capitalize
through production, will then choose instead to seek a profit from those
36. See Sandburg, supra note 9.
37. Id.
38. Patent Hearings, supra note 24, at 15 (statement of Dean Kamen, President,
DEKA Research & Development Corp.).
39. See Grab, supra note 11, at 84; Patent Trolls: Unfair Name-Calling or Threat to the
Patent System?, 69 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 565 (2005) ("Trolls are not
themselves inventors, but lawyers or investors who acquire paper patents from insolvent
individuals or companies at fire-sale prices .. "); Alexander Poltorak, On "Patent Trolls"
and Injunctive Relief, IPFRONTLINE, May 12, 2006, http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/
article.asp?id=10854&deptid=4; see also Patent Hearings, supra note 24, at 1.
40. See Grab, supra note 11, at 108.
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infringing on the patent. 41 Most typically, however, trolls are investment
companies or groups of individuals who exclusively purchase and collect
patents for the purpose of licensing.42
These companies frequently seek and find cheap, but potentially
lucrative, patents during bankruptcy auctions for failed technology compa-
nies. 4 3 Trolling entities are sometimes formed specifically in anticipation
of such auctions, where patents with the potential to affect large corpora-
tions are available. 44 For example in 2004, vague, unenforced software pat-
ents owned by Commerce One-a bankrupt Silicon Valley software
company-were sold to a pool of bidders.45 The potential to use these pat-
ents to threaten companies such as Microsoft and IBM drew intense bid-
ding from patent trolls, and ultimately a newly formed company, JGR
Acquisitions Inc., purchased the patents.46
When purchasing patents, trolls specifically target patents that are
applicable in a wide variety of products, relate to a critical element of an
existing or potential system or device, or threaten companies that are
wealthy enough to afford extravagant licenses. 47 To their advantage, the
available patents tend to be "older patents, which may have been forgotten
or overlooked (and thus cost less to acquire) but still play a roll [sic] in
modern technology."48 Acquired patents usually are of questionable valid-
ity, cover trivial parts of overall products, or cover dubious business
method patents.49 Trolls are not daunted by these potential weaknesses
because they are not relying on patents to exclude others from use or to
provide revenue through application and innovation.50 In actuality, the
overly broad nature of these patents is an advantage that allows patent
trolls to cast a wider net when threatening potentially infringing
industries.51
41. See Chan & Fawcett, supra note 7, at 2.
42. See DOMINIQUE GUELLEC & BRUNO VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTrERIE, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM: IP POLICY FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 96
(2007); see, e.g., Acacia Technologies, L.L.C. Patent and Licensing and Technology-Pro-
file, http://www.acaciatechnologies.com/aboutus-main.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2009)
(explaining that the company is "in the business of acquiring, developing, licensing and
enforcing patents"); BTG-Company Overview, http://www.btgplc.com/About/191/
CompanyOverview.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009) (discussing its licensing revenue).
43. See Grab, supra note 11, at 83. For example, one of the most famous troll compa-
nies, TechSearch, L.L.C., started when its founder purchased chip technology patents
from a bankrupt company and then sued Intel for infringement. See id. at 83 n.17.
44. See Barker, supra note 18, 11 2-3 (discussing a corporation specifically formed
to purchase patents from a bankrupt electronic software company during its bankruptcy
auction).
45. See id. 9[ 7; Chan & Fawcett, supra note 7, at 2.
46. See Barker, supra note 18, 91 3.
47. See Basic Framework for Effective Responses to Patent Trolls, supra note 13, at 3
(listing various motivating factors that patent trolls consider prior to acquiring patents).
48. Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Comment, Patent Investment Trusts: Let's Build a PIT to Catch
the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 367, 376 (2005).
49. Grab, supra note 11, at 98.
50. Id. at 84.
51. See id. at 108.
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C. Modes of Attack-Predatory Patent Enforcement
Once a troll acquires a sufficient number of threatening patents, it ini-
tiates its business plan: maximize revenue through licensing fees, settle-
ments, and litigation damage awards. 52 if the target industry is lucrative
and present, the trolls will immediately begin attacking companies in pur-
suit of profits. 5 3 Otherwise, they will act like the mythical troll: they will
hide under the bridge, quietly holding on to their patents, and watch for
emerging industries that unknowingly develop infringing products. 5 4
When these industries develop sufficient value to turn a profit, the trolls
will launch their offensive and spring on the unprepared companies as
they cross the infringement bridge.5 5
Regardless of when the troll decides to attack a potentially infringing
company, its goal is to maximize income and minimize costs. 5 6 Thus, for
trolls, the ideal vehicle is a licensing agreement.5 7 Trolls employ various
models for generating licensing fees from their patents. To capitalize on
the urgency most companies feel in making the trolls disappear, they can
request relatively low licensing fees of about $30,000 to $70,000 from hun-
dreds of targets, thus accumulating income from several sources with mini-
mal effort.58 Or, to decrease the administrative costs of contracting and
collecting fees, they can increase the fees just below the costs of defense
(approximately $200,000 to $750,000) and pursue fewer companies. 5 9
Frequently trolls use both methods and leverage their successes to request
higher licensing fees. 60 They may also sue a series of small- and medium-
sized companies who refuse to pay licensing fees to create legitimacy
within the courthouse. 6 1 In this way, they begin generating significant
income and credibility from settlement payments, licensing fees, and litiga-
tion remedies before chasing after the well-established, extremely wealthy
Fortune 500-type companies that are their ultimate goal.6 2 Recently trolls
have even expanded beyond federal district court actions and brought suit
in the International Trade Commission, forcing foreign companies entering
the U.S. market into domestic licenses. 63
52. Id. at 85.
53. See Barker, supra note 18, 9 7.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. Basic Framework for Effective Responses to Patent Trolls, supra note 13, at 3.
57. Barker, supra note 18, '1 2.
58. See Basic Framework for Effective Responses to Patent Trolls, supra note 13, at 3.
59. See id.
60. See Chan & Fawcett, supra note 7, at 1.
61. See, e.g., Refac Int'l, Ltd. v. Hitachi Ltd., 141 F.R.D. 281 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (illus-
trating a patent-holding company pursuing several small and medium companies on
infringement claims to generate revenue).
62. See Chan & Fawcett, supra note 7, at 1.
63. See posting of Joe Mullin to The Am Law Daily Blog, Will the ITC Become the New
Troll Hangout?, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/01/a-new-troll-hang-
out.html (an. 13, 2009, 22:09 EST).
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D. Limited Options When Facing Off with a Patent Troll
Why do these non-producing entities have such power over legitimate
industries? When faced with a challenge by a patent troll, productive com-
panies, both small and large, have very limited options. Although they may
choose to work around the alleged infringement to create a product that
does not infringe, the risk of failure and substantial research costs decrease
the feasibility of this option.64 Companies must then decide between set-
tling with the patent troll and entering a licensing agreement for continued
use or challenging the alleged infringement in court.6 5
1. Option 1: Exorbitant Licensing Fees
Most companies choose to settle and license patents for their desired
uses from patent trolls.6 6 Traditionally, settlements between two patent-
holding companies have involved cross-licensing agreements in which the
companies swap rights to each other's patents.6 7 This form of "mutually
assured destruction" essentially guarantees that the companies will not sue
each other over patented products and drives down settlement costs. 68 But
settlements with patent trolls are different. Patent trolls have no interest in
cross-licensing agreements because reciprocal licenses are not valuable to
them.69 As a result, the trolls have a bargaining advantage which they use
to manipulate and threaten parties until they exact extremely high licens-
ing fees. 7 0
2. Option 2: High-Risk, High-Cost Litigation
Companies that choose to take patent trolls to court face high-risk and
high-cost litigation. Half of judge and jury decisions in patent disputes are
reversed on appeal, and the average patent lawsuit costs $4.5 million.7 1
Moreover, the trolls' business model allows them to adopt unusually tena-
cious litigation strategies. Unlike other patent-holders, patent trolls do not
fear exposure to liability, counterclaims for infringement, or unfair trade
practices. 72 Also, patent trolls do not have the same litigation costs, or
employee, customer, and shareholder concerns as other companies
involved in patent protection litigation. 73 Significantly, unlike traditional
technology companies that pay legal fees by the billable hour, patent trolls
often operate on contingency fee agreements with law firms: the troll pays
64. Damian Myers, Note, Reeling in the Patent Troll: Was eBay v. MercExchange
Enough?, 14J. INTELL. PROP. L. 333, 335-36 (2007).
65. Id. at 336.
66. See Barker, supra note 18, 9 10.
67. Paul M. Mersino, Note, Patents, Trolls, and Personal Property: Will eBay Auction
Away a Patent Holder's Right to Exclude?, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 307, 316 (2007).
68. See id. at 315-16; see also Chisum, supra note 25, at 340.
69. See Mersino, supra note 67, at 316-17.
70. See id.
71. See Chan & Fawcett, supra note 7, at 4; Patent Hearings, supra note 24, at 27
(testimony of Chuck Fish, Vice President & Chief Patent Counsel, Time Warner).
72. See Basic Framework for Effective Responses to Patent Trolls, supra note 13, at 1.
73. Id. at 1.
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no fees unless there is a favorable ruling or settlement, in which case the
law firm receives a substantial fraction of the amount.74 These contin-
gency fee arrangements, with potential payoffs of up to $22.5 million per
suit, are extremely attractive to lawyers as well.
7 5
Thus, trolls have significantly less to lose than the traditional litigants
they face in court. There is, however, a constant threat that the court will
invalidate the troll's patent, making it unenforceable both in court and for
licensing purposes, thereby undercutting the revenue stream. 7 6 Still, the
extremely high burden of proof in patent cases dissuades many litigants
from challenging the validity of a troll's patent; because patents enjoy a
presumption of validity, the attacked party would need to make a showing
of clear and convincing evidence of invalidity to invalidate a troll's pat-
ent.7 7 Furthermore, even if the party successfully argues invalidity, it does
so at its own cost because the United States does not operate on a "loser
pays" basis.7 8 Therefore, attacked parties usually choose to argue non-
infringement instead of invalidity because such arguments are less costly
and relatively easier to prove, requiring only a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 7 9 Yet, even non-infringement arguments are daunting because of
the often overbroad and ambiguous nature of the troll's patents.80
When the patent troll wins, the technology company loses much more
than the lawsuit. Often, remedies for patent infringement include injunc-
tions and damages.8 1 If the troll successfully argues for injunction, it is
essentially a death sentence for a company's product: a once lucrative prod-
uct becomes worthless and its revenue stream almost immediately
ceases.8 2 Although damages seem to be a better option, patent trolls often
demand damage royalties calculated based on the whole product even
though the troll's patent often only applies to a small portion or feature of
the product. 83 Furthermore, courts frequently, in their discretion, find
that a company has willfully infringed on a troll's patent and therefore
multiply damages by up to three times.8 4 To help their chances of willful-
ness damages, trolling entities often strategically and enigmatically notify
74. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 338 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "contingent fee").
75. See Victoria E. Luxardo, Comment, Towards a Solution to the Problem of Illegiti-
mate Patent Enforcement Practices in the United States: An Equitable Affirmative Defense of
"Fair Use" in Patent, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 791, 795 (2006).
76. See Cedric A. D'Hue, Disclosing an Improper Verb Tense: Are Scientists Knaves and
Patent Attorneys Jackals Regarding the Effects of Inequitable Conduct?, 14 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. LJ. 121, 146 (2006) ("Now that the patent is unenforceable, the... company will
not have that revenue stream .... ").
77. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
78. SeeJay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents Survive in the Market and
How Should We Change?- The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY LJ. 61, 69
n.36 (2006) (discussing why companies are deterred from meritoriously challenging the
validity of even bad patents).
79. See Chan & Fawcett, supra note 7, at 4.
80. See Chuang, supra note 29, at 228.
81. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-284.
82. See Chan & Fawcett, supra note 7, at 5.
83. Chisum, supra note 25, at 347.
84. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
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companies that they are infringing before filing complaints, providing
effective proof for these claims.8 5 Even if a troll-fearing company diligently
implements a pre-clearance patent search, it inadvertently exposes itself to
future claims for willfulness, and thus this is a common damage claim by
patent trolls.8 6
3. An Example of Troll Control: NTP v. Research In Motion
Although a troll has yet to shut down a major Fortune 500 company,
some predict that the time is nearing.87 Trolls have launched massive law-
suits against some of the most successful and powerful technology corpora-
tions, including eBay, Intel, and Microsoft. 88 Most notably, in 2001, NTP,
a private holding company whose only asset was a wireless e-mail patent
portfolio, almost shut down Blackberry wireless service in the United
States.8 9 NTP was small by patent troll standards-it held only twenty-five
patents and was run out of the co-founder's home. 90 This small entity filed
suit against Research In Motion (RIM), the producer of the Blackberry
device, after RIM ignored NTP's letters demanding licensing fees.9 1 NTP
convinced the jury that RIM willfully infringed on eleven of its patents, and
the court awarded NTP damages of $23 million.9 2 After final motions, the
district court judge increased the damages to $53 million and issued a per-
manent injunction enjoining RIM from manufacturing, importing, using,
or selling any of the accused Blackberry devices.9 3 The injunction, which
was stayed awaiting appeal, would have forced RIM to cease all Blackberry
services that infringed on NTP's patents. 94 Facing this grim situation, RIM
settled and purchased a license from NTP for $612.5 million.95 Notably,
the lawyer representing NTP, operating on a contingency fee basis, received
over $200 million for representation. 96 This case has since been the hall-
mark in advocates' struggle against patent trolls.
85. See Patent Hearings, supra note 24, at 9 (prepared statement of Edward R. Reines,
Partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP).
86. See Chan & Fawcett, supra note 7, at 8.
87. See Nicholas Varchaver, Who's Afraid of Nathan Myhrvold?, FORTUNE, June 26,
2006, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune archive/2006/07/ 10/83807
98/index.htm.
88. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Eolas Techs.
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Sandburg, supra note 9.
89. See Grab, supra note 11, at 85.
90. Id. at 86.
91. Id.
92. See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
93. See id. at 1291-92.
94. See id. at 1292.
95. See Grab, supra note 11, at 87.
96. See Posting of Ashby Jones to WSJ Law Blog, Wiley Rein Gets a Big Slice of Black-
Berry Pie, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/03/17/wiley-rein-gets-a-big-slice-of-black
berry-pie/ (Mar. 17, 2006, 08:43 EST).
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11. U.S. Efforts to Minimize Effect of Patent Trolls
A. Divisive Effects
The U.S. Constitution mandates a quid pro quo exchange in patent
law.97 By disregarding this exchange, the patent troll's business model
seriously undermines the policies underlying the patent system and has
severe effects on innovation and competition. 98 They produce nothing;
instead, they exploit loopholes within the patent system to collect fees from
companies that produce valuable products without conferring any public
benefit.9 9 Patent trolls effectively amount to "a hidden tax on technology
products, hampering innovation and preventing a large number of prod-
ucts from entering the market because the manufacturer could not afford
the risk of patent litigation." 10 0
First, the presence of patent trolls inevitably increases transaction
costs. 10 1 Due to patent trolls, companies are forced to divert resources
from research and development toward preemptively searching for patents
owned by trolls, paying off settlements and licensing agreements, and fund-
ing litigation efforts. 10 2 These costs not only stagnate innovation, they
also eventually increase the cost of the product for consumers. Second,
innovating companies are more cautious when investing in research and
development. 10 3 Companies hesitate before innovating because they fear
that a new product may unknowingly infringe on a troll's patent and, thus,
ultimately result in costs that outweigh the potential profits. 10 4 The uncer-
tainty of whether a troll's patent is valid or broadly applies to their product
will also deter and distort the direction of the company's investments in
innovation.' 0 5 For example, an independent software inventor, Brandon
Shelton, was progressing through testing of his innovation (with twenty
interested entities awaiting test completion) when a well-known troll, Aca-
cia Research Corp., demanded a licensing fee. 10 6 Acacia alleged that the
97. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Ferrill, supra note 48, at 369-70.
98. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 28, 95 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter A PATENT SYSTEM]
(contending that patents on trivial innovations shift resources away from the innovation
and towards legal bickering, without throwing off consumer benefit). But see Raymond
P. Niro & Paul K. Vickrey, The Patent Troll Myth, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 153, 156 (2006)
(arguing that although patent trolls do not produce tangible goods, they strengthen the
patent system and encourage compensation for innovation).
99. See A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 98, at 95; see also Mersino, supra note 67, at
315-16.
100. Ferrill, supra note 48, at 377.
101. See A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 98, at 95 (suggesting that bad patents raise
litigation and settlement costs).
102. See id. at 95; Myers, supra note 64, at 337;
103. See A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 98, at 95 (suggesting that "uncertainty about the
validity of previously issued patents may deter investment in innovation and/or distort
its direction").
104. See Myers, supra note 64, at 337 (noting that manufacturers may be reluctant to
bring products to market when patent trolls could possibly attack).
105. A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 98, at 95.
106. See Michael T. Burr, Reinventing the Patent Act, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 2005, at
38.
Cornell International Law Journal
inventor was infringing on a patent that effectively claimed the rights to
one of the most basic functions of the Internet. 10 7 Although the inventor
recognized that if litigated, the patent would likely be unenforceable, he
did not have the funding to fight in court, so he abandoned his innovation
and the potential investors. 108 Undoubtedly, scenarios similar to this one
occur routinely, continually pushing both small and large entities away
from potential innovations.
B. The Industry's Response
The biggest players in the technology industry, many of whom have
become the target of patent trolls several times, have begun to collectively
launch offensives against the trolls through various means.10 9 In an
attempt to undercut patent trolls' acquisition of patents, an elite group of
technology companies joined forces to create Allied Security Trust
(AST). t l0 AST polls its members' interests in particular patents; if two or
three members express interest, AST attempts to buy them from the patent
holder."1 AST then freely licenses the purchased patents to any of AST's
members for the patents' duration. 11 2 AST vows that it does not partici-
pate in any patent licensing fee endeavors similar to those of patent
trolls. 1 1 3 Membership is self-selective: to join, companies must donate $25
million and only forty companies can join.114 Although the goal is to pre-
vent potentially damaging patents from entering the hands of patent trolls,
this exclusivity limits the capital and thus the scale of the endeavor. There-
fore, AFT is not a sustainable long-term solution.
Recognizing that legislative reform may be the only potential solution
to solving the troll epidemic, several congressional lobbying organizations
composed of industry leaders have formed the Coalition for Patent Fair-
ness. 115 Companies such as Apple, Google, VeriSign, Dell, Cisco, and eBay
joined the Coalition, a group concentrated on lobbying the Legislative
Branch to reform the patent system. 1 6 Other groups such as the Informa-
tion Technology Industry Council and the Business Software Alliance,
although not exclusively dedicated to patent reform, have made patent
trolls and reform issues a priority on behalf of major industry
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. SeeJ.P. Mello, Legal Update, Technology Licensing and Patent Trolls, 12 B.U. J. Sci.
& TECH. L. 388, 397-98 (2006).
110. Allied Security Trust I, About Us, http://www.alliedsecuritytrust.com/index2.
html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Allied Security Trust].
111. See Antone Gonsalves, Tech Heavyweights Launch Patent Trust, INFORMATIONWEEK,




114. Allied Security Trust, supra note 110.
115. See, e.g., Coalition for Patent Fairness, Who Supports Change, http://www.pat-
entfairness.org/learn/who/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
116. See Coalition for Patent Fairness, Patent Reform Supporters, http://www.patent
fairness.org/learn/who/supporters/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
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companies.117
C. Legislative Efforts
In recent years, Congress has considered substantial patent reforms,
potentially the most drastic since 1952, including those targeted at patent
trolls.1 18 The impetus for these reforms was pressure from industry
groups and the release of two independently significant reports from the
Federal Trade Commission' 19 and the National Research Council of the
National Academies. 120 Both of these reports specifically address the pat-
ent troll problem as an imminent threat to the legitimacy of the patent sys-
tem. 12 1 In response to these reports, members of the House of
Representatives proposed a bill entitled the Patent Quality Assistance Act of
2004 (PQAA).1 22 The PQAA integrated several critical changes into the
patent system. That is, it allowed people to initiate proceedings in opposi-
tion to patents even after the patents had been granted, it set higher stan-
dards for the degree to which business methods would have to be
nonobvious before they were eligible for patenting, and it limited injunctive
relief.123 All of this would decrease patent trolls' bargaining power in set-
tlements and licensing agreements and make litigation more balanced.
Although the PQAA did not pass, in the subsequent congressional ses-
sion, members introduced a more exhaustive and drastic reform bill, the
Patent Reform Act of 2005.124 During the consideration of the bill, the
House of Representatives conducted a hearing specifically addressing the
patent troll issue. 125 The testimony emphasized that Congress' efforts to
reform injunctive relief, willfulness damages, continuation applications,
and damage apportionment would have significant deterrent effects on pat-
ent trolls. 12 6 Testimony during the hearings also warned that as a result of
the patent trolls, the patent system was unbalanced and there was a dire
need to return the system to an equitable balance. 127 Despite this testi-
mony and lobbying by interest groups for immediate and drastic patent
reform, the House never passed the Patent Reform Act of 2005.128
In its 110th session, Congress again proposed a patent reform bill-
117. See Letter from Coalition for Patent Fairness to Hon. Harry Reid and Hon. Mitch
McConnell (Oct. 24, 2007), available at www.sifma.org/regulatory/comment-letters/56
131678.pdf.
118. See Chuang, supra note 29, at 243.
119. See generally FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003) [hereinafter FTC REPORT], available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
120. See generally A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 98.
121. FTC REPORT, supra note 119, at 31; see A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 98, at 96.
122. 130 CONG. REC. E1935 (2004) (statement of Hon. Howard L. Berman).
123. See generally Patent Quality Assistance Act of 2004, H.R. 5299, 108th Cong.
(2004).
124. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
125. Patent Hearings, supra note 24, at 1.
126. See id. at 9-11 (prepared statement of Edward R. Reines).
127. See id. at 8 (prepared statement of Edward R. Reines).
128. See Thomas, supra note 14, at 733.
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the Patent Reform Act of 200712 9 -that largely resembled those proposed
in 2004 and 2005. On its third try at patent reform, on September 7, 2007,
the House of Representatives passed the bill. 130 Unfortunately, despite its
success in the House, a similar bill proposed in the Senate stalled on the
Senate floor. 13 1 Nearly identical versions of the 2007 bills have been pro-
posed in both the House and Senate in the 111th session, though at the
time of this Note's publication there has been no progress on either bill.13 2
Thus, notwithstanding significant efforts on the part of several members of
Congress, the Legislative Branch has been unable to resolve the patent troll
dilemma. Even if passed, many experts argue that the broad changes
would not only hurt patent trolls, but would also equally affect those legiti-
mately seeking patent protection. 133
D. Judicial Efforts
Although the Legislative Branch has effectively made no progress in
ending the reign of the patent troll, the judiciary recently stepped up its
efforts, on all levels, to resolve the issue.
At the Supreme Court level, there have been a few significant cases
that will have major effects on patent trolls in the coming years. Arguably
the Court's most powerful decision was eBay v. MercExchange, in which the
Supreme Court overruled the patent-specific automatic injunction rule
after alleged patent trolls threatened a well-respected and productive com-
pany. 13 4 The Court held that instead of automatically awarding an injunc-
tion to the infringed party, the party seeking an injunction
must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.13 5
Justice Kennedy, who appeared particularly concerned with the patent troll
problem, specifically suggested that district courts should apply the factors
more strictly when dealing with entities that use injunctions as "a bargain-
ing tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to
129. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
130. See id. at 80.
131. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); see Steve Tobak, Patent
Reform Act Stalls in the Senate, CNGT NEws, May 12, 2008, http://news.cnet.oom/8301-
13555_3-9941241-34.html.
132. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of
2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009).
133. See D. Brian Kacedon, Michael V. O'Shaughnessy &John C. Paul, Patent Trolls: A
Stereotype Causes a Backlash Against Patents and Licensing, 41 LES NOUVELLES 224, 232
(2006) ("These changes, however, will not just affect the few bad actors who abuse the
system, but will unnecessarily burden all patent owners and licensors regardless of the
quality of their patents or the nature of their licensing and enforcement activities.").
134. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
135. Id. at 391.
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practice the patent."'136
The equitable eBay injunction test strips a troll of a large portion of its
litigation advantage. Because most trolls do not practice the patents they
seek to license, they will have difficulty proving the second prong of the
test-that monetary remedies are inadequate compensation. The refusal of
injunctive relief in some district court cases since eBay confirms this pre-
diction.13 7 eBay removes the threat of injunctions from a troll's playbook,
but it does not stop the trolls from litigating and demanding licensing fees.
Although they have less leverage without injunctions, very high monetary
damages might still be obtained, especially if willful infringement is
found. 1 38
Another recent Supreme Court decision, MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., provides patent licensees who have succumbed to a patent
troll with a more lenient standard for filing declaratory judgment actions
against the troll. 139 The Supreme Court held that under the "all the cir-
cumstances" standard, patent licensees could continue to pay licensing
royalties yet still present the actual and substantial controversy necessary to
bring a declaratory judgment action to determine the validity of a licensed
patent. 140 Yet MedImmune's impact on patent troll licenses is limited
because the Court held that declaratory judgment is not available to the
defense of invalidity alone; there must be at least an express threat by the
patent licensor or some source of apprehension of a suit.' 4 ' Even so, some
predict that MedImmune will diminish trolls' ability to use legal threats as a
means of extracting advantageous licensing agreements. 14 2 MedImmune
will provide some relief to those already engaged in license agreements
with patent trolls, but the effect is likely to be minimal and short-lived:
Patent trolls will ultimately be able to tweak licensing agreements to protect
against declaratory judgments. 143
136. Id. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
137. See, e.g., z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(refusing to grant injunction to a patent troll because monetary awards were sufficient
and appropriate).
138. Although 35 U.S.C. § 284 does not articulate the specific conditions under
which "the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found," the
Federal Circuit has held that the patent owner must demonstrate willfulness to be
awarded such increased damages. See In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2007). A finding of willfulness requires a showing of objective recklessness.
See id. at 1371.
139. See generally 549 U.S. 118 (2007). This controversy originated when MedIm-
mune, while continuing to pay royalties, filed a declaratory judgment action claiming
Genentech's licensed patent was invalid. Id. at 121-22. The district court found the
action non-justiciable under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Id. at 122.
140. See id. at 127.
141. See id. at 120-25.
142. See Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls: A Novel
"Cold Fusion" Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. LJ. Sci. & TECH. 407,
466 (2007).
143. See Jennifer L. Collins & Michael A. Cicero, The Impact of MedImmune upon Both
Licensing and Litigation, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 748, 750-56 (2007) (dis-
cussing various ways patent trolls can alter licensing agreements to avoid risking declar-
atory judgments post-MedImmune).
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Recently the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the exclusive
appellate court for patent litigation decisions, 14 4 has decided cases that, in
effect, curtail the power of patent trolls. In the 2007 In re Seagate Technol-
ogy L.L.C. decision, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, increased the stan-
dard for proving willful patent infringement. 1 45 Previously, a party had an
affirmative duty of care, upon actual notice of another's patents, to avoid
infringement. 14 6 Seagate raised the bar of willful infringement, requiring
clear and convincing evidence of "objective recklessness."'1 4 7 As a result,
trolls, who routinely claim willfulness to increase their damage awards,
must now expend more effort in proving that companies objectively
infringed, which increases their litigation CoStS. 1 4 8 The decision also
decreases the paralysis that troll opponents face when entering court
because the court will evaluate willfulness based on pre-litigation
actions. 1 4 9 Therefore, a potential infringer can continue to produce with-
out fear of increasing damages. 150 The Federal Circuit has also dealt blows
to patent trolls on the issue of patentability of business methods.' 5 ' Most
recently, the court, in its en banc decision In re Bilski, narrowed, but did
not completely eradicate, the business method patent.' 52 At the district
court level, some courts are proactive against patent trolls, 15 3 while others
144. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-About the Court, http://
www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
145. See 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
146. See Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 1380,
1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Where, as here, a potential infringer has actual notice of
another's patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine
whether or not he is infringing.").
147. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 ("[T]o establish willful infringement, a patentee must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively
high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent."). The court
relied on the definition of willfulness provided by the Supreme Court and sister appel-
late courts in other legal contexts, such as copyright, to justify the heightened standard.
Id. at 1370-71.
148. See Dov Greenbaum, Comment, In re Seagate: Did It Really Fix the Waiver Issue?
A Short Review and Analysis of Waiver Resulting from the Use of a Counsel's Opinion Letter
as a Defense to Willful Infringement, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 184 (2008).
149. See Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374 ("[A] willfulness claim asserted in the original
complaint must necessarily be grounded exclusively in the accused infringer's pre-filing
conduct. By contrast, when an accused infringer's post-filing conduct is reckless, a pat-
entee can move for a preliminary injunction, which generally provides an adequate rem-
edy for combating post-filing willful infringement.").
150. See id.
151. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that business
method patents must still fall within one of the four § 101 categories to be valid); In re
Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (refusing to accept that its State Street
Bank precedent widened the scope of patentability for business method patents).
152. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The relevant patent was a business
method for hedging risks in commodities trading. See id. at 949-50. The examiner
rejected all eleven claims of the patent because the claims did not satisfy the subject-
matter requirement according to Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 950.
153. Sam Williams, A Haven for Patent Pirates, TECH. REV., Feb. 3, 2006, http://www.
technologyreview.com/InfoTech-SOftware/wtr_16280,300,pl.html?PM=GO (noting that
the Eastern District of Texas is more patent troll friendly than other district courts).
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defend them. 15 4
III. Lessons Learned from a Troll-Free Europe
A. Troll-Free Europe
With the success of patent trolls in the United States, many would
expect that these creatures enjoy equal success on the playgrounds of
Europe, especially given the relatively lower cost of litigation in many Euro-
pean countries.1 55 Surprisingly that is not the case. Although Europe had
glimpses of patent troll attacks, its innovators and technology industry
generally do not suffer from the same abuses as their U.S. counterparts. 15 6
This section explores the differences between the two patent grant and
enforcement systems, looks for potential explanations, and considers what
the United States can learn from these key differences.
B. Lessons from the European Patent Office (EPO)
Today, Europe has an autonomous legal system for granting and
appealing patents. 157 The European Patent Office, located in Munich, Ger-
many, was founded in 1977 pursuant to the 1973 European Patent Conven-
tion 15 8 (EPC). 159 The EPO embodies the main objective of the EPC: "to
strengthen co-operation between the States of Europe in respect of the pro-
tection of inventions ...that such protection may be obtained in those
States by a single procedure for the grant of patents and by the establish-
ment of certain standard rules governing patents so granted. ' 160 Thus, the
EPO streamlines the patent application procedure by requiring only one
application, in a single language, 16 1 to be submitted and evaluated under a
single set of guidelines. 162 The granted patent confers a bundle of national
rights within the Contracting States. 16 3
The EPO is seen as a counterpart to the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO). Like the PTO, the EPO applies a consistent stan-
dard of patentable subject matter, validity, and novelty to determine
154. Id.
155. See Luxardo, supra note 75, at 805.
156. See GUELLEC & DE LA POTTERIE, supra note 42, at 96; Brennan, supra note 34,
§ X.A; Macdonald, supra note 33. But see Philippa Maister, German Court Sees First Signs
of European Patent Trolls, LAW.COM, Oct. 2, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id
=1202424954133.
157. See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE, WILLIAM 0. HENNESSEY & SHIRA PERLMUTTER, INTERNA-
TIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PATENT LAW 63 (2002).
158. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255
[hereinafter European Patent Convention].
159. See European Patent Organisation, Legal Foundations, http://www.epo.org/
about-us/epo/legal-foundations.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
160. European Patent Convention, supra note 158, pmbl.
161. The application must be in French, English, or German. Id. art. 14.
162. See id. art. 14(2) (stating that the application must be translated into one of the
official languages in accordance with the Implementing Regulations).
163. See GERALD PATERSON, THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
THE EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION 88 (2d ed. 2001).
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whether or not it can grant an application. 16 4 The records for each grant
are kept on file at the EPO, and anyone wishing to challenge a patent's
validity can bring opposition proceedings through the EPO. 1 6 5 Thus,
when comparing the grant of patents in the United States and Europe, it is
necessary to compare the procedures of these two offices. The goal of this
Note is to ascertain key differences in the procedures of these two offices
that may explain the variation in the prevalence of troll activity between the
United States and Europe and how trolling activity can be decreased in the
United States without deteriorating its patent system.
1. Patentable Subject Matter
Arguably a troll's most powerful tool is an overly broad patent or one
that teeters on the edges of patentability. 16 6 Both the PTO and EPO require
patent applications to overcome a basic hurdle before they begin further
substantive evaluations: the patent's subject matter must be statutorily pat-
entable. 16 7 Neither the U.S. statute nor the EPC explicitly define "inven-
tion,"16 8 but both outline specific exclusions from patentability. 169 The
scope of patentability within the EPC is significantly narrower than its U.S.
counterpart, which may explain why trolls in Europe cannot obtain the
overly broad and questionable patents that they litigate successfully in the
United States. In Europe, several specific areas of subject matter are ineligi-
ble for patentability: discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical
methods; aesthetic creations; schemes, rules and methods for performing
mental acts, playing games or doing business; programs for computers;
and presentations of information. 170 The explicit exclusion of business
methods in Europe is the most relevant exclusion in the comparison
between European and U.S. patentability standards. Both of the business
methods exclusions are premised on the lack of a "technical considera-
tion," either, a technical means or a technical solution to an objective
problem. 171
In Europe, the state of the law and the practice of business methods
have recently diverged, but both remain predominantly against the issu-
ance of business method patents. 17 2 According to the EPC, business
method patents are invalid-there is no technical character and no patenta-
bility-if the effect achieved by following the method is purely economic or
administrative (essentially a processing of information). 1 7 3 The few busi-
164. See European Patent Convention, supra note 158, arts. 52-57.
165. Id. art. 99.
166. See Brennan, supra note 34, § VI.1.
167. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (2006); European Patent Convention, supra note 158, art.
52.
168. 35 U.S.C. § 100; see KLUWER LAW INT'L, CONCISE EUROPEAN PATENT LAW 30 (Rich-
ard Hacon & Jochen Pagenberg eds., 2d ed. 2008).
169. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103; KLUWER, supra note 168, at 29.
170. European Patent Convention, supra note 158, art. 52(2).
171. KLUWER, supra note 168, at 31; see Case T 0208/84 - 3.5.1, Vicom, 1986 O.J.
EPO 14.
172. See PATERSON, supra note 163, at 406.
173. KLUWER, supra note 168, at 31.
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ness-related patent applications that meet the technical requirements of
patentability 174 typically still fail for lack of inventive step. 175 Recently,
through the EPO's issuance and court decisions, there has been a push to
allow business method patents, and through often convoluted statutory
interpretations, some patents have issued for innovative computer-imple-
mented claims. 1 76 Lawmakers countered this push in 2005 when they
rejected an initiative to harmonize European patent law with that of the
United States. 177 Without any explicit allowances for business method
patents, the validity of business method patents in Europe remains uncer-
tain, and it is this uncertainty that is likely a factor deterring trolls from
pursuing litigation with one of their favorite types of patent.1 78
Although precedent within the United States used to be equally protec-
tive against granting business method patents, 179 the Federal Circuit
explicitly extended patentability to business methods in 1998.180 Since
then, the amount of business method patent applications has increased by
650%, flooding the PTO.181 As a result, patents for simple, broad methods
such as "method of swinging on a swing,"18 2 which require minimal
research and development costs, have been granted. Such patents would
174. See, e.g., Case T 258/03 - 3.51, Hitachi, 2004 OJ. EPO 575.
175. See KLUWER, supra note 168, at 31. But see PHILIP LEITH, SOFTWARE AND PATENTS
IN EUROPE 147-48 (2007) (listing examples of recent business method patents that are
proceeding through the EPO, including the Amazon 'l-click' business method patent
that was granted and subsequently opposed, to illustrate Europe's increasing warmth
towards business methods).
176. Robert E. Thomas & Larry A. DiMatteo, Harmonizing the International Law of
Business Method and Software Patents: Following Europe's Lead, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
1, 4 (2007). But see GUELLEC & DE LA POTTERIE, supra note 42, at 130 (discussing the
2004 Hitachi decision and Europe's relatively more restrictive position on business
methods).
177. See Laura R. Ford, Alchemy and Patentability: Technology, "Useful Arts," and the
Chimerical Mind-Machine, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 49, 49 (2005) (reporting that "[o]n July 7,
2005, the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly to reject" a proposed directive to
harmonize European and American business method and software laws).
178. See DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 157, at 115 (discussing Pension Benefit Systems
Partnerships, T931/95 (2000) (citing Michal Likhovski, Fighting Patent Wars, 23 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 267, 270 (2001))); Thomas & DiMatteo, supra note 176, at 4.
179. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874). But see
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (extending patentability to a discov-
ery that "is not nature's handiwork, but his own").
180. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[T]he court relied on the judicially-created, so-called 'busi-
ness method' exception to statutory subject matter. We take this opportunity to lay this
ill-conceived exception to rest."); see also AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d
1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
181. See Thomas & DiMatteo, supra note 176, at 8 n.40 (citing U.S. Patent & Trade-
mark Office, Patent Business Methods - Class 705 Application Filing and Patents Issued
Data, http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pbmethod/applicationfiling.htm) (last visted
Oct. 5, 2009)).
182. Method of Swinging on a Swing, U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000)
(issued Apr. 9, 2002). The abstract of the patent states "[a] method of swing [sic] on a
swing is disclosed, in which a user positioned on a standard swing suspended by two
chains from a substantially horizontal tree branch induces side to side motion by pull-
ing alternately on one chain and then the other." Id.
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never survive in the EPO. 18 3 The quick proliferation of these broad patents
has made many businesses, who continue to use the same business meth-
ods that they have always used, vulnerable to patent infringement claims
by patent holders and trolls who are equipped with patents as broad as
"swinging on a swing."'1 84
The United States should follow Europe's lead by returning to its pre-
vious stance of non-patentability for business methods-not only to pre-
vent trolls from acquiring overly broad patents, but also to enable the
United States to move towards harmonization with Europe. The Federal
Circuit has already taken the lead in this area. In its 2008 In re Bilski deci-
sion, the court returned to the narrower "machine-or-transformation" test
previously applied by the Supreme Court. 185 Despite this decision, which
only applies to future business method patents, trolls still possess several
previously issued business method patents that are being used against pro-
ductive companies. 186 To avoid a continuation of this troll practice, the
Judiciary and the Legislature should continue to narrow the scope of busi-
ness method patents.
2. Opposition Proceedings
Patent troll victims face two intertwined hurdles-the overwhelming
cost of litigation and a high standard for proving patent invalidity. 187 A
less expensive and expedient method of challenging the validity of a troll's
patent would ameliorate these issues. Both the EPO and PTO provide an
administrative channel for challenging a patent's validity-opposition pro-
ceedings and reexamination, respectively-but Europe's opposition pro-
ceedings allow for broader validity challenges and more contentious and
adversarial participation by the parties.1 8 8 This difference may be crucial
in providing troll victims with a preemptive opportunity to challenge a
troll's patent or an alternative to litigation, which in turn may decrease a
troll's power to extract exorbitant licensing agreements because they pose a
less daunting threat.
Through Europe's opposition proceeding, within the first nine months
of a patent's issuance, any person can challenge an issued patent as wrong-
183. See LEITH, supra note 175, at 19.
184. Thomas & DiMatteo, supra note 176, at 8-9.
185. 545 F.3d 943, 959-60 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Therefore, we also conclude that the
'useful, concrete and tangible result' inquiry is inadequate and reaffirm that the
machine-or-transformation test outlined by the Supreme Court is the proper test to
apply.").
186. See, e.g., Sandburg, supra note 9 (discussing ongoing licensing agreements
between patent trolls like TechSearch and other technology companies).
187. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing the daunting challenge of litigating against pat-
ent trolls).
188. See PATERSON, supra note 163, at 91; see also Jordan K. Paradise, Recent Develop-
ment, Lessons from the European Union: The Need for a Post-Grant Mechanism for Third-
Party Challenge to U.S. Patents, 7 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 315, 315-16 (2005) (illustrat-
ing how the differing post-grant review processes can lead to the same patent being
revoked in Europe and maintained in the United States).
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fully granted based on any grounds of a patent's validity. 18 9 Specifically,
challengers are able to oppose granted patents on the basis of lack of pat-
entability, 190 insufficient disclosure, 19 1 and extension of the scope of pro-
tection beyond what was contained in the application as originally
granted. 1 92 Challenges to lack of patentability include raising issues of
excludable subject-matter, lack of novelty, lack of industrial application,
and lack of inventive step.1 9 3
The Opposition Division, which handles opposition proceedings, con-
sists of three technical examiners. 1 94 These examiners preside over inter
partes proceedings, which the EPO has determined "under the EPC are in
principle to be considered as contentious proceedings between parties nor-
mally representing opposite interests, who should be given equally fair
treatment."19 5 Both sides-the challenger and patent holder-must present
evidence to prove or protect against opposition. 1 96 The EPO has broad dis-
cretion over the admissible documents, but generally does not limit the
types of documents or their content.19 7 The Opposition Division may also
allow for oral evidence and may summon witnesses and experts at the
request of the parties during the opposition proceeding. 198 The process is
flexible; there is no fixed schedule for these filings and oral proceedings,
and parties can file observations and communications as often as
necessary.' 9 9
As a result of the opposition proceeding, the Opposition Division may
revoke the patent and declare it invalid across all Contracting States, can
amend the patent, or reject the opposition.2 00 Oppositions often cost less
than $20,000 per side (with each side bearing its own cost), and approxi-
mately one-third of challenged patents are ultimately revoked. 20 1 Com-
189. See European Patent Convention, supra note 158, arts. 99-105; KLUWER, supra
note 168, at 126-42.
190. European Patent Convention, supra note 158, art. 100(a) ("[T]he subject-matter
of the European patent is not patentable under Articles 52 to 57.").
191. Id. art. 100(b) ("[Tihe European patent does not disclose the invention in a man-
ner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the
art.").
192. Id. art 100(c) ("[T]he subject-matter of the European patent extends beyond the
content of the application as filed .... ").
193. See KLUWER, supra note 168, at 130; Haitao Sun, Note, Post-Grant Patent Invalida-
tion in China and in the United States, Europe, and Japan: A Comparative Study, 15 FORD-
HAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 273, 304 (2004).
194. See PATERSON, supra note 163, at 91; Sun, supra note 193, at 305.
195. Case G 9/91, Rohm and Haas Company, 1993 OJ. EPO 408, 414.
196. See Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds in Administrative Revocation of U.S.
Patents: A Proposition for Opposition-and Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH LJ. 63, 154 (1998).
197. See id.
198. See European Patent Convention, supra note 158, art. 116; KLUWER, supra note
168, at 159-60; Soobert, supra note 196, at 154; Sun, supra note 193, at 306.
199. See Sun, supra note 193, at 306.
200. See European Patent Convention, supra note 158, art. 101.
201. See Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent
System- Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 1005 & n.74
(2004); Sun, supra note 193, at 308.
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mentators predict that the effectiveness of this low-cost alternative to
litigation ultimately decreases the number of patents and prevents invalid
patents from being litigated. 20 2 This may be one of the major factors that
make trolls less successful and less attracted to the European system.
In contrast with Europe, U.S. patent law's reexamination process does
not provide a broad post-grant procedure for third parties to challenge pat-
ents.20 3 Although the initial goal in creating a reexamination proceeding
in the United States was to create an administrative alternative that would
"resolve validity disputes more quickly and less expensively than litiga-
tion . . . [and] strengthen confidence in patents whose validity was
clouded, ' 20 4 the proceeding has not been as effective as its European coun-
terpart. Until 1999, only ex parte reexaminations were permitted; these
reexaminations allowed any person to file a request, 205 but they severely
limited the person's participation in the process to a single response to the
patent owner's statements if the patent owner chose to make any.20 6 In
1999, the American Inventors Protection Act allowed for "inter partes reex-
amination" that would allow the opponent to participate in the process and
respond to the patent owner. 20 7 Although this examination brings U.S.
reexaminations closer to those in Europe, the mechanism has been scarcely
used, and, when it is used, still subject to the narrow scope of ex parte
reexaminations. 20 8
Both ex parte and inter partes reexaminations are only granted if the
PTO determines that "a substantial new question of patentability affecting
any claim of the patent concerned is raised by the request. ' 20 9 The exam-
iner evaluates the patent according to the same standards as the initial
examination, but he can only refer to certain prior art-previously submit-
ted patents or printed publications-when conducting the reexamina-
tion.2 10 As a result, reexaminations are mostly limited to issues of novelty
and obviousness, while contestable issues in Europe's opposition proceed-
ings-such as patentable subject matter, enablement, and disclosure- all
202. See Hall & Harhoff, supra note 201, at 1006-07.
203. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (2006); Paradise, supra note 188, at 322.
204. IRAH H. DONNER, PATENT PROSECUTION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE 2180 (4th
ed. 2005); see H.R. Rep. No. 107-120, at 3 (2001).
205. 35 U.S.C. § 301 ("Any person at any time may cite to the [Patent] Office in writ-
ing prior art consisting of patents or printed publications which that person believes to
have a bearing on the patentability of any claim of a particular patent.").
206. Id. § 305.
207. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501
(1999) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122).
208. See FTC REPORT, supra note 119, at 16; Sun, supra note 193, at 313-14 ("Several
aspects of the inter partes reexamination are similar to those of ex parte reexamination:
any third party can, at any time, file a request for inter partes reexamination of a patent;
the prior art that can be relied upon for inter partes reexamination is the same as for ex
parte reexamination; . . . the Patent Office will determine whether the request raises a
substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim of the patent; the reexami-
nation will be conducted according to the procedures established for the initial examina-
tion ... " (internal citations omitted)).
209. 35 U.S.C. § 303(a).
210. Id. § 301.
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must be determined in court.2 11 Thus, both the narrow scope of substan-
tive examination and the minimal participation of parties in the proceed-
ing prevent troll-targeted opponents from bringing reexamination
procedures in lieu of litigation or preventative licensing.
Harmonizing the PTO's reexamination process with Europe's more
effective opposition procedure is an important lesson that the United
States must learn from Europe. In fact, several federal agencies have
already issued reports proposing a more effective and robust opposition
procedure as a key step to preventing patent trolls.2 1 2 Moreover, the Patent
Reform Acts 213 proposed procedures that would allow third parties to initi-
ate a legal challenge to a patent within nine months of issuance, or allow
accused infringers to initiate challenges within six months of receiving
notification that the patent holder has filed claims for patent infringe-
ment. 2 14 Opponents and alleged infringers would be able to bring chal-
lenges on the basis of patentable subject-matter, utility, novelty,
nonobviousness, written description, enablement, and disclosure-provid-
ing a scope of substantial review equivalent to that in civil litigation. 21 5
Expanding the scope of the process to allow the evaluation of "substantial
new questions of patentability" to extend beyond prior art to a broader
range of submitted documents may be sufficient to allow troll-threatened
parties and others to avoid litigation. The threatened party can thus chal-
lenge the validity of the patent without adding the oral procedure aspects of
the European opposition process, which would likely burden the PTO with
higher costs and unduly extend the processing time for patent challenges.
A U.S. adoption of the legislative version of the opposition procedure
would decrease the costs of challenging a patent, lessen a patent's powerful
presumption of validity, and keep patent troll litigation out of the courts-
an ideal combination to strip the trolls of the power from which they now
thrive. 21
6
3. EPO Administrative Costs
In addition to the substantive differences between the EPO and PTO, a
key deterring factor for patent trolls in Europe may be the expense of
obtaining and maintaining a patent. The procedural fees of the EPO are
more than three times that of the PTO. 2 17 In addition, although an EPO-
granted patent consists of an instant bundle of patent rights,21 8 patent
211. See Soobert, supra note 196, at 88; Sun, supra note 193, at 311.
212. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN
9-11 (2003), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2l/stratplan-03
feb2003.pdf; see also FTC REPORT, supra note 119, at 8; A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 98,
at 82.
213. The Patent Reform Acts of 2005 and 2007 were never made into law, due to
opposition from the House and the Senate, respectively. See supra Part II.C.
214. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 9 (2005).
215. See id. § 3.
216. See Chan & Fawcett, supra note 7, at 10.
217. See DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 157, at 718.
218. See PATERSON, supra note 163, at 88.
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holders must incur validation costs before being able to exercise their
exclusive rights. 219 They must pay fees for mandatory translations of the
complete patent specification into the official language of each of the desig-
nated contracting states and official validation fees to the national patent
offices of each of those states. 220 On average, European patentees validate
their patents in eight contracting countries, resulting in costs up to twelve
times that of their U.S. counterparts. 22 1 After accounting for additional
expenses, such as renewal fees due to each contracting country, a Euro-
pean patent holder expends approximately $36,000 maintaining its patent
rights over the twenty-year duration of the patent in comparison to the
approximately $13,000 it costs a U.S. equivalent. 22 2 The general expense
and complexity of this fee and validation system may potentially deter
trolls, whose main objective is maximizing returns on their patent invest-
ments. Although the trolls' typical acquisition occurs after the patent
issues,2 2 3 so that EPO initial fees would be largely irrelevant, the expense
may be passed on to trolls when they purchase the patent. 224 Regardless,
they are likely to have to pay for the validation expenses as well as the more
expensive renewal fees, which clearly add up quickly.
Although there is no U.S. equivalent to the European contracting
states, the United States could borrow from the EPO model by increasing
the PTO's administrative fees and renewal costs. 22 5 However, despite its
potential to deter money-hungry trolls, this across-the-board increase in
patent maintenance expenses is unlikely to be the solution for the United
States because it not only affects patent trolls, but also adversely affects all
patentees. 2 26 This presents an interesting potential solution: if fines could
be tailored to specifically target patent troll activity or if renewal periods
could be used as an opportunity to deter trolls, the expense deterrent may
work. For example, one commentator has suggested that during each
renewal time, the new patent holder, potentially a troll, would need to pay
for a review of its patent's validity and active use. 22 7 If the patent is not
actively used or does not meet the basic patentability requirements during
this review process, then the patent would be declared invalid and enter the
public domain. 228 This review would increase the overall cost to patent





223. See Ferrill, supra note 48, at 376.
224. See DINWOODIE ET At., supra note 157, at 718.
225. U.S. patent holders pay maintenance fees following the third, seventh, and elev-
enth years after the patent has issued. Barker, supra note 18, 30 (citing A PATENT
SYSTEM, supra note 98, at 31).
226. See id. 34.
227. See id. ' 30 (arguing for an open review mechanism during various periods of
the patent's life as a means of preventing trolls from enforcing overly broad and poten-
tially invalid patents).
228. See id. 9 31.
264 Vol. 42
2009 Lessons from Europe
use of the patents they hoard,2 29 and would decrease the amount of pat-
ents trolls could acquire.230 Alternatively, the PTO could enforce a basic
charge when patents are transferred to non-producing entities or a fine
when, during renewal, the owner cannot prove active use. These options,
loosely borrowed from Europe's patent maintenance cost system, may help
lessen the troll dilemma.
C. Lessons from European Patent Infringement Litigation
As the EPC suggests, the European patent system thus far primarily
focuses on granting patents and upholding validity, but not on patent
enforcement.2 3 ' Under this scheme, until grant and post-grant challenges
to validity, European patents funnel through the EPO. 232 But upon grant,
the single patent becomes enforceable as a "bundle of patent rights"2 33 that
must be litigated on a national level in each of the member states. 234 A
decision in a national court does not affect any of the other patent rights in
the "bundle" because they are controlled by different national laws and
courts. 2 35 Thus, in comparing patent litigation in the United States and
Europe, it is necessary to explore litigation procedures on a national level.
Because little comparative research has been conducted to date236 and an
in-depth comparison is beyond the scope of this Note, this Note will briefly
discuss certain distinctive and particularly relevant procedures imple-
mented in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, where the majority
of European patent litigation occurs.2 37
1. Litigation Costs: The "Loser Pays" Policy
With every litigated case come hidden and often significant costs,
predominantly in the form of attorney fees.2 38 This continually skyrocket-
ing amount, which can add up to $4.5 million per suit, is a major deterring
factor for parties who would otherwise challenge trolls in court.2 39 The
different way in which Europe and the United States deal with this cost
highlights another significant lesson that the United States can learn from
Europe.
229. See id. 34.
230. See Luxardo, supra note 75, at 820.
231. European Patent Convention, supra note 158, art. 64(3) ("Any infringement of a
European patent shall be dealt with by national law.").
232. See generally id.
233. See PATERSON, supra note 163, at 20.
234. See TERENCE PRIME, EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 176, 195 (2000).
235. See id. at 176.
236. See LEITH, supra note 175, at 185 ("There appears to be little comparative
research conducted on the different procedural approaches in Germany, France, Italy,
and UK on litigation.").
237. See MIKE PANTUL1ANO ET AL., MULTINATIONAL PATENT LITIGATION 3 (1996).
238. See Solveig Singleton, Patents and Loser Pays: Why Not?, PROGRESS ON POINT (The
Progress & Freedom Found., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2006, at 1, 2, available at http://
www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/popl3.3patents-losers.pdf.
239. See supra Part I.D.2.
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Most of Europe follows what is known as the "loser pays" rule:240 a
policy of reimbursement whereby the parties who lose in litigation pay the
winners' legal expenses and attorney fees. 24 1 This policy generally leads to
less predatory litigation because defendants are more willing to represent a
plaintiff with a weak case or patent of questionable validity in court.2 4 2
Additionally, when defendants choose to settle, the settlement amount
tends to be lower than that in the United States. 24 3 The greatest fear with a
"loser pays" rule is that it gives wealthy litigants an unfair advantage; how-
ever, research in Europe (where this is the general rule) suggests that this
fear is unfounded. 24 4 Instead, studies have found that the rule signifi-
cantly deters speculative lawsuits-the type often brought by patent trolls-
by imposing potential financial liability. 245
The "American Rule" for patent litigation has been and currently is
that each party bears its own costs of litigation, win or lose. 246 But there is
an exception; Section 285 of the U.S. Code provides that in "exceptional
cases [the court] may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party."'24 7 However, the burden of proving an "exceptional case" is very
high, requiring the defendant to prove bad faith equivalent to fraud on the
PTO in order to invoke fee-shifting. 248 Furthermore, the implementation
of this exception lies solely in the judge's discretion 2 49 and, in reality, only
occurs in about 1% of suits that end by pre-trial motion or trial. 250 As a
result, in the United States, the costs of litigation is at the forefront of a
party's mind when deciding whether or not to accept a troll's court date.
The "loser pays" system should be adopted in some form to ameliorate
the exorbitant litigation costs that prevent parties from bringing potentially
240. This rule is also known as the "English Rule." See Singleton, supra note 238, at
3.
241. See W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is
the United States the "Odd Man Out" in How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 361, 403 (1999).
242. See Singleton, supra note 238, at 3.
243. See MARIE GRYPHON, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, GREATER JUSTICE,
LOWER COST: HOW A "LOSER PAYS" RULE WOULD IMPROVE THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 17
(2008), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cjr 11.pdf.
244. See Singleton, supra note 238, at 4 (discussing how various "loser pays" coun-
tries have used payment schedules, insurance policies, and other methods to prevent
strategies of piling up costs into a large single bill to force the other side to go bankrupt).
245. See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 763, 787 (2002); Singleton, supra note 238, at 3.
246. See GRYPHON, supra note 243, at 13.
247. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006).
248. See Cambridge Prods., Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients, Inc., 962 F.2d 1048, 1050-51
(Fed. Cir. 1992) ("In the case of awards to prevailing accused infringers ... 'exceptional
cases' are normally those of bad faith litigation or those involving fraud or inequitable
conduct by the patentee in procuring the patent."); see also Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d
749, 753-54 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (illustrating the extent of misleading the PTO, wasting
court resources, and dragging defendants through litigation that is necessary for a judge
to invoke § 285's "exceptional circumstances" fee-shifting).
249. See Luxardo, supra note 75, at 818.
250. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical
Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEwIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 18 (2005).
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successful and valid claims to court. Already, researchers have evaluated
the effectiveness of a "loser pays" system in the United States and deter-
mined that it would indeed decrease the number of weak, nuisance law-
suits like those brought by patent trolls.2 5 1 In response, legislative efforts
have supported a shift to a form of the "loser pays" system. For example,
the Senate's version of the Patent Reform Act of 2006 sought to amend
Section 285 to read: "The court shall award, to a prevailing party, fees and
other expenses incurred by that party in connection with that proceeding,
unless the court finds that the position of the nonprevailing party or par-
ties was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust."25 2
Although the "loser pays" system boasts many advantages, many
issues still linger that may be preventing the legislature from shifting the
entire patent system to "loser pays."'25 3 Scholars have suggested several
incremental proposals that would allow "loser pays" to immediately affect
the most outrageous lawsuits and dubious patent claims without making a
drastic shift.25 4 One viable proposal includes a limited shift that would
apply only to patents invalidated by a court or revoked by the PTO.255
This measured approach may be the ideal, immediate resolution to the
daunting litigation costs facing patent-troll victims.
Any shift from the "American Rule" to a "loser pays" rule would be a
significant blow to patent trolls. 25 6 Under the threat of covering not only
their own but also their opponents' litigation costs, trolls would be less
likely to bring litigation.25 7 As a corollary, those threatened by trolls
would likely offer less in settlement negotiations and would be willing to
litigate more often against dubious or overbroad patents, thereby decreas-
ing patent trolls' revenue and the costs to society.
251. See GRYPHON, supra note 243, at 17-23 n.43 (discussing various studies proving
that under loser pays there will be less dubious lawsuits, lower settlement rates, and
overall lower costs of litigation).
252. Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5(b) (2006). But the House
of Representatives' version does not appear to contain this provision. See Patent Reform
Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
253. See Singleton, supra note 238, at 5.
254. See id. (presenting Kesan's idea and also proposing an amendment that would
provide judges with greater discretion in awarding fees); see also GRYPHON. supra note
243, at Executive Summary (proposing "a modified offer-of-judgment rule, which ties
the amount of any fee award to the size of the parties' settlement offers, and advocates
the removal of legal barriers to the establishment of a robust litigation insurance indus-
try in new loser-pays jurisdictions").
255. Kesan, supra note 245, at 770 (proposing "a one-way, pro-defendant fee shifting
system [for situations where] patents are invalidated or revoked in a litigation or opposi-
tion proceeding based on certain categories of prior art that are reasonably likely to be
discovered by a diligent patentee").
256. See id. at 789 ("[T]he loser-pays rule would reduce speculative litigation and
limit the tactical leverage gained by a party with a weak case threatening a defendant
with costly litigation. This rule may also deter excessive discovery and the filing of
unnecessary motions.") (citations omitted); Singleton, supra note 238, at 4.
257. See Luxardo, supra note 75, at 820.
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2. Attorney Fees
Another significant difference between Europe and the United States is
the prevalence of contingency fee litigation. 258 This arrangement is the
main instrument that allows patent trolls to significantly decrease the
financial risk of litigation and that incentivizes lawyers to assume trolls'
cases. In Europe, most litigation is performed on a fixed or hourly fee
basis due to significant restrictions on contingency fee litigation.2 59 In
fact, contingency fee arrangements are strictly forbidden in European
countries. 260 The most analogous arrangement is the British conditional
fee in which the attorney is paid an hourly fee with the added potential for
a "success fee" upon winning the case. 2 6 1 Unlike contingency fees, the
success fee is a set amount that is independent of the party's damages
awards. 2 62
Contingency fee litigation is most popular in the United States. 2 63
Under this fee arrangement, clients do not pay the attorney unless the
attorney wins the case, and even then the fee amount is often a function of
the damages awarded.2 64 Although this fee arrangement does shift sub-
stantial risk of loss and costs to the attorney, the fee for winning at trial is
often significantly greater than the fee under the hourly or fixed rate
arrangement. 265
Contingency fee litigation impacts the U.S. legal system in several neg-
ative aspects:2 66 it produces more litigation, 267 higher damage awards, 26 8
258. See Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees
and UK-Style Conditional Fees (CEPR Discussion Papers, No. 4473, 2004), available at
http://www.fep.up.pt/conferences/earie2005/cd-rom/Session%201I/II.K/nunowinand.
pdf.
259. See Virginia G. Maurer, Robert E. Thomas & Pamela A. DeBooth, Attorney Fee
Arrangements: The U.S. and Western European Perspectives, 19 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 272,
307 (1999).
260. See Emons & Garoupa, supra note 258, at 2 ("[P]actum cuota litis is not allowed
by the ethical code of the European association of lawyers.").
261. See Maurer et al., supra note 259, at 309.
262. See id. Public policy outlaws fee arrangements proportional to damage awards.
See id. at 309-10.
263. See id. at 293.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 304 (suggesting that contingency fee lawyers usually obtain 20%-50%
of damages awarded); see also Lester Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence: Tort System Outcomes Are Principally Determined by Lawyers' Rates of
Return, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755, 1773 nn.57-60 (1994) (citing hourly rates of return
for contingent fee attorneys of $25,000-$50,000 per hour); Geoffrey P. Miller, Some
Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 189 (1987) ("The attorney effec-
tively purchases an equity interest in the litigation from the plaintiff, offering his or her
future services in exchange for a percentage of the recovery.").
266. See Stewart Jay, The Dilemmas of Attorney Contingent Fees, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
813, 813 (1989); Grant P. DuBois, Modify the Contingent Fee System, 71 A.B.A. J., Dec.
1985, at 38.
267. See Maurer et al., supra note 259, at 296; Gerald Walpin, America's Failing Civil
Justice System: Can We Learn from Other Countries?, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 647, 654
(1997).
268. See Michael A. Dover, Contingent Percentage Fees: An Economic Analysis, 51 J. AIR
L. & COM. 531, 551 (1986).
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and is potentially a propelling factor in the rapid emergence of patent
trolls. Despite these problems, contingency fees are a staple of U.S. litiga-
tion and would likely face significant resistance if eliminated. Thus, the
lesson emerging from this difference may be for the United States to imple-
ment a patent-specific limit on contingency fee litigation that would allow
for an upscale premium payable upon victory but unrelated to the amount
of damages awarded. 26 9 Ideally, this change would detract from the moti-
vation of lawyers to take on patent troll cases, as a result increasing up
front legal costs for trolls.
3. Overall Litigation Complexity
One last possible explanation for the lack of patent trolls in Europe
relative to the United States is the European patent enforcement system as a
whole; that is, complex and varying national laws may in themselves scare
away the patent trolls.2 70 A troll armed with a European patent can pursue
alleged infringers in any of the EPC member countries; but, if the infringe-
ment is multinational, to win the infringement war the troll will have to
wage several individual litigation battles according to each country's
national laws.27 1 Although, on average, each national battle is less expen-
sive than its equivalent within the United States, cumulatively the cost can
add up, especially without the possibility of contingency fee arrangements.
Furthermore, without a unifying European patent court, different interpre-
tations of European patent law by national courts have emerged, creating
the potential for inconsistent decisions from one country to another.
2 72
If the overall complexity of patent litigation in Europe plays a predomi-
nant role in deterring patent trolls, then the United States can learn little
from this complexity. The patent enforcement system in the United States
is unified, with a singular Federal Court of Appeals addressing all patent
appeals from federal district courts, and this system is unlikely to ever
change.
Conclusion
Patent trolls continue to take an expansive toll on society by forcing
either expensive litigation or exorbitant license fees on legitimate, produc-
tive companies. The United States Judiciary, Legislature, and affected busi-
nesses have taken some measures to curb troll activity, but to end the
patent troll epidemic, they should take significant measures immediately to
269. The patent-specific requirement stems from the fact that contingency fee litiga-
tion is essential, beneficial, and more efficient than other fee arrangements in other
areas of the law, such as tort and personal injury law. See Emons & Garoupa, supra note
258, at 6-17 (modeling the efficiency and necessity of contingency fee litigation).
270. See Brennan, supra note 34, § X.C ("This different litigation system may make
things difficult for patent trolls with the strategy of taking small amounts of money from
many different companies because it is difficult and expensive to deal with a different
system in each country.").
271. See PRIME, supra note 234, at 176.
272. Id. at 217.
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begin to rein in these trolls. In doing so, both the Judicial and Legislative
Branches should look to the tactics that have been effective in staving away
trolls in Europe. In applying lessons from Europe, it is important that
changes to the U.S. patent system are either narrowly tailored to target pat-
ent trolls or improve the patent system as a whole. Given the difficulty in
defining patent trolls, the latter option appears to be best.
Possibly the best lesson learned from comparing the two patent sys-
tems-a lesson that has already been embraced by commentators and fed-
eral agencies-is that the United States should create a more robust,
efficient, and broader opposition procedure that would allow those
targeted by patent trolls to challenge the validity of the patent in a cheaper
and more expedient manner than civil litigation. Simultaneously, a more
substantive opposition procedure will increase the public's confidence in
the patent system and the quality of existing patents. Moreover, the Legis-
lature should implement a form of "loser pays" allotment of litigation costs
that imposes financial liability on patent trolls who sue over invalid or
overly broad patent claims. If such an opposition procedure exists, trolls
will have less leverage against their prey and, as a result, will be incapable
of demanding the royalties and awards that they currently collect.
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